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One of the most common approaches to environmental action consists in designing and
implementing pilot experiments, which aim at testing new practices and organisations. These
technical or socio-political innovations are then supposed to spread. However, the way such a
juxtaposition of experiments is expected to lead to a global transformation of our development paths
and of their environmental dimension remains quite mysterious, if not mythiﬁed. Analysing the pilot
approach as a strategy of change, this article offers a concise view on what is at stake in the
replication hypothesis underlying the approach.
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strategy of change.
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BILLÉ ACTION WITHOUT CHANGE? ON THE USE AND USEFULNESS OF PILOT EXPERIMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
1. INTRODUCTION
The implementation of sustainable development calls for drastic
changes in our current development trends. Such changes will
entail radical transformations of the economic, cultural and other
relations we entertain with our environment and of our
management practices. Although most of the path that will lead
us towards the utopia of sustainability is yet to be mapped out and
followed, it is clear that a change of trajectory, practices and
policies is necessarily at the centre of all debates.
Several avenues are available to address this change issue. One
of the most widespread in the ﬁeld of research and action focused
on sustainable environmental management is to set up pilot
experiments in order to experiment with new practices and
organisation forms. Those technical as well as socio-political
innovations are supposed to spread and eventually to be adopted
by other stakeholders in different, often contrasting contexts.
Pilot experiments, as “recipes for mobilization” (Lecomte, 1986),
have a well-established tradition in public action. They have a
great success in the ﬁeld of environmental management, be it in
the case of traditional problems, such as ﬁsheries management,
or of recently emerging issues, like avoided deforestation. The
way in which this spectacular juxtaposition of more or less novel
experiences is expected to give rise to a global transformation of
our development modes and of their environmental “content” is
therefore a crucial issue.
It thus seems a paradox that the social, political and
organisational dynamics associated with those pilot experiments
are so little studied and mostly, so little understood (Saunders,
2003). Of course, there are numerous studies, amongst others in
anthropology, which have analyzed the process of diffusion of
sociotechnical innovations: Olivier de Sardan (1995), for example,
shows their potential contribution, although he essentially limits
his study to agropastoral innovations. However, the experience
we have acquired in research as well as in project development
and evaluation, shows us that de facto, those contributions are
usually ignored in the ﬁeld of environment, either actively, or by
remaining largely unknown, or by not fully responding to the
needs of the stakeholders. In the end, the way in which a pilot
experiment exerts or fails to exert an inﬂuence on “routine”
practices remains quite mysterious. A substantial number of
evaluations have shown that those experiments possess intrinsic
characteristics that prevent them from provoking more important
changes in practices, that is from being replicated. Nevertheless,
the “piloting strategy” is still called upon under very different sets
of circumstances in order to reach various goals, generally
without any serious justiﬁcation.
In the present paper, we will therefore examine the use of pilot
experiments as a strategy for change. Our goal is to propose a
concise analysis of this subject, from both a theoretical and a
practical point of view. We will start by deﬁning the problem more
precisely and then discuss the appeal of pilot experiments and
examine in more detail the issues surrounding their replication,
which lies at the heart of the strategy of change implicitly linked
to “piloting”.
2. THE NATURE OF PILOT EXPERIMENTS
A pilot experiment, as we deﬁne it, is an action undertaken by one
or more public and/or private stakeholders in order to test novel
practices or technologies, i.e. innovations in the sense of Olivier
de Sardan (1995): “every graft of novel technology, knowledge or
form of organization (generally as local adaptation of borrowed or
imported innovations) on existing technologies, knowledge or
forms of organization”. Following the hypothesis of the
“’proximity contamination’ of the change process” (Behar, 1997),
commonly referred to as the “ripple effect” hypothesis, the main
characteristic of a pilot experiment is to be implemented on a
smaller scale than that of the ultimate objective: local or regional
scale for national objectives, pilot farms for watershed-wide
objectives, individual work unit for objectives at the whole
administration or company scale, etc.. The Brestian Roadstead
Contract (France) is a typical example. Although its eventual
objective was the reduction of pollution from agricultural sources
at the scale of the entire watershed (2 800 km2, 137
municipalities), its preliminary phase led to the establishment of,
among others, pilot experiments in the basin of the Kerouallan
River, involving only 600 hectares of agricultural land spread over
just two municipalities (cf. Turpin, Bouraoui et Tranvoiz, 1999 ;
Billé, 2004).
Pilot projects are a speciﬁc, but widely used variant of the pilot
experiment. They deserve particular attention because they
combine the advantages and disadvantages of a project on one
hand and those of “piloting” on the other hand. Therefore, they
have all the characteristics of a pilot experiment, paired with
those of a project as a particular form of organisation of action.
Generally speaking, a project is a “temporary organisation”
(Turner et Müller, 2003) that is commonly deﬁned as follows:
“Endeavour in which human, material and ﬁnancial
resources are organised in a novel way, to undertake a
unique scope of work, of given speciﬁcation, within
constraints of cost and time, so as to achieve beneﬁcial
change deﬁned by quantitative and qualitative objectives”
(Turner, 1993).
We will concentrate here on the “pilot” dimension since the
shortcomings of the project approach as such have been
exhaustively described elsewhere (cf. for example Lecomte, 1986
or Bako-Arifari and Le Meur, 2001 in the context of development
aid; Billé and Mermet, 2002a or Billé, 2007 in the context of
integrated coastal zone management). Some key ﬁndings are (1)
that projects have often shown their limitations in sustaining their
existence from the moment the ﬁnancing comes to term; (2) that
they don’t easily conform to the longer time scales characteristic
of social change and collective action; (3) that they are extremely
sensitive to even small changes in local conditions (for example
loss of a leader) or in the external context; ﬁnally (4) that they
2 BILLÉ | P2
1 Without going as far as implying a cause and effect relationship, it is noteworthy that integrated coastal zone management emerged and was formally and procedurally ﬁrst adopted
in countries in which the project approach to public action has the longest history.
BILLÉ ACTION WITHOUT CHANGE? ON THE USE AND USEFULNESS OF PILOT EXPERIMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
S
.
A
.
P
.
I
.
E
N
.
S
contribute to the fragmentation of public action. It is well known
in organisation theory that projects create a need for integration:
integration of resources in order to implement the project,
integration of the different parts of the project, integration of the
project in the general activity (Turner et Müller, 2003). This is of
course a signiﬁcant drawback, and even a paradox in the case of
integrated management projects1.
Regardless, the pilot experiment contains by its very nature
many of the characteristics of the project: temporary
intervention with set goals and means, frequently relying on
small ad hoc structures.
3. AN INDISPUTABLE POWER OF SEDUCTION
Their very logic hence seems to enable pilot experiments to
circumvent bureaucratic slowness, which is often considered
necessary. Pilot experiments are reputed to be more ﬂexible and
better suited to adapt to the uncertainty of processes and
objectives (Turner et Müller, 2003) than routine operation-based
action. This is why pilot experiments offer leeway for social
and/or technical innovation. They obtain results at a smaller
scale, with moderate costs and a more consensual participation
of concerned stakeholders than large-scale projects tackling the
same issues (Saunders, 2003).
In the environmental ﬁeld, key stakeholders often need to be
persuaded in the ﬁrst place, since those calling for change are
rarely those able to implement it. In this regard, pilot experiments
have a strong power of seduction for decision makers. As
Saunders (2003) shows, many resistances can be overcome
simply by classifying a political innovation, desired by certain
stakeholders, as a pilot experiment: “do not worry, it is just an
experiment!”. Stakeholders who are recalcitrant to change are
more ready to accept a pilot experiment if they still feel in control
of processes on a larger scale, where the real stakes are at hand.
Going back to the case of the roadstead of Brest, where pollution
from agricultural sources, and in particular from intensive pig
farming, is a major environmental issue and a constant source of
conﬂict, a wholesale transformation of the regional agricultural
model would have been required. However, this was a politically
sensitive, if not taboo, issue. In that context, the Chamber of
agriculture and the research organisms depending on the
Ministry of Agriculture chose a small sub-basin in which to work
with farmers and suggest the use of modiﬁed, environmentally
less harmful yet economically viable practices, such as the
reduction of technological inefﬁciencies or the introduction of
new feed practices for animals. The experiment was considered
a success: it demonstrated the feasibility of the necessary
transformations, in partnership with the concerned sector,
although it did not have any repercussions for the practices in
question at a larger scale.
More precisely, pilot experiments generally have a double tactical
advantage. First, the “ripple effect” remains a convincing
argument in the eyes of many decision makers and is often a
winning argument in grant applications. The ideal progression
“national ambition / local pilot actions / duplication and
generalization” constitutes the framework of many initiatives in
environmental management and indeed of the majority of
environmental projects undertaken in the context of development
aid. The domestic or international replicability of projects is even
a selection criterion of both the French global environment facility
(Fonds Français pour l’Environnement Mondial, FFEM) and the
Global Environment Facility (GEF). Thus, for example, the support
of international cooperation in the management of protected
areas in a developing country will often be initiated through the
implementation of “innovative” practices in one national park
with the implicit expectation – ﬁngers crossed – that the proven
efﬁciency of those practices will be sufﬁciently persuasive for
them to be spread nationwide to the extent of becoming the norm.
It requires more effort and justiﬁcations to stray from this
scheme, to question it or to proceed with caution than to adopt it
strictly, even if its limits are well known. Second, considering the
urgency, the scope and the complexity of the problems at hand
and the difﬁcult changes they entail, the pair of “pilot experiments
/ later generalization” gives scientists and environmental
advocates something “to gnaw on”. It leaves the impression of
“being on the right path” and that “one can’t rely on past trends
since we are about to change things”. As Mermet (1996) points
out, “the administration must not discourage its administered (or
its own agents….) and usually likes to adopt a reasonable
optimism, once the scarecrows have been brandished. After that,
all energy and attention is focused on the management of a few
promising pilot operations, which eventually induces a global
sense of optimism”.
Our observations lead us to conclude that, although pilot
experiments achieve various degrees of success, in general, they
rarely initiate the dynamics they are supposed to “pilot”: they may
be replicable, but are rarely replicated.
4. REPLICABILITY: 
THE MYTH OF THE “RIPPLE EFFECT”
4.1 STIMULATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
The hope for a “proximity contamination of the change process”,
which is the foundation of the concept of pilot experiments,
relies on a heavy assumption in the ﬁeld of collective action: 
that the combination of an objective beneﬁt of a given change
and of an external impulse brings a human group to move
towards this change.
However, research in the general ﬁeld of collective action, and in
the environmental ﬁeld in particular, does not support the
hypothesis that “good practices” are bound to spread. The claim
that the “objective” and collective interest of a group of humans,
or even that of its individual members, to adopt a particular mode
of environmental management is a sufﬁcient condition for them
to do so, ignores most theories on collective action. For instance,
Olson (1965) writes:
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order to please him. This can severely bias the conclusions drawn
with respect to the pertinence of an intervention or the
reproducibility of a new mode of management.
4.3 FROM EXCEPTIONAL CONDITIONS, EXCEPTIONAL RESULTS
The cases we have studied or in which we have participated
clearly show that “pilot” results are all the more easily obtained,
the more exceptionally favourable conditions are chosen.
Therefore the ﬁrst step in setting up a pilot experiment is usually
to identify a space (territory, community, sub-basin,
administrative unit, etc.) in which the conditions before the
intervention seem favourable enough to offer the best promise of
success. One of the fundamental parameters often taken into
account is the presence of key individuals, talented and
charismatic leaders thriving towards innovation (Saunders, 2003).
Later on, the anticipated upscaling of the experience is hindered
by personalities less driven by innovation, less motivated and less
prone to change, be it out of lack of conviction, for reasons of
personal agenda (such as career opportunities), because of
decisions on the allocation of available resources, or others. In
the “pilot operation Menabe” lead by the regional environmental
program of the Indian Ocean Commission, the pilot region was
chosen amongst other reasons because of the existence of a
regional development committee (“Comité régional de
développement”), unique in Madagascar and without any ofﬁcial
existence in the national politico-administrative system,
considered reliable, energetic and with strong leadership under
the authority of a motivated local dignitary (Billé, 2004).
4.4 DECREASING RESOURCES APPLIED 
TO INCREASING DIFFICULTIES
Not only are pilot experiments conducted in exceptional and well-
chosen conditions, they also beneﬁt from exceptional ﬁnancial,
human and technical means. Depending on the case, these can be
speciﬁcally devoted ﬁnancial resources, technical assistance, the
presence of mediators, or particular political support. The
presence of local mediators or the availability of ﬁnancial
resources (travel expenses and per diem) to support stakeholder
participation in the various consultative processes of development
aid projects are examples of such exceptional resources.
What is more, this concentration of resources is employed in a
context where resistance to change is weak. As we have already
seen, pilot experiments that promote cultural change, change of
practices and innovative organisation modes tend to be tolerated
by stakeholders who are the bearers of the “traditional” and
dominant modus operandi as long as they remain pilot ventures.
Therefore, they do not have to face the opposition that usually
appears in the latter stages, at least not at its full strength or
diversity. The resistance to change on behalf of those who have a
real or perceived interest in maintaining the status quo only
begins in the phase of replication and upscaling. At that stage,
studies have identiﬁed what Saunders (2003) refers to as
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“…even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational
and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, they 
acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they
will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or 
group interest,,,”
except in speciﬁc conditions, such as with a small group of
individuals, coercion or “some other special device”. This of course
also ignores a large body of work on the phenomenon of the spread
of changes and innovation mentioned above. Different coastal zone
management projects which we studied, for example in
Madagascar (Billé et Mermet, 2002b), demonstrate the heaviness
of the “common interest” hypothesis of collective action, as a look
at the management of ﬁsheries worldwide also reveals. Ostrom
gives a speciﬁc set of conditions under which this type of collective
action becomes possible. In another domain and at a different
scale, the difﬁculty the international community experiences in
organizing itself in order to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions
despite the collective economic interest clearly demonstrated by
the Stern report (Stern et al., 2006), speaks volumes.
4.2 THE HAWTHORNE EFFECT
What is more, the simple presence of an observer, an advisor or
a facilitator in a human group modiﬁes its behaviour, through the
presence of an external view. Not only does it modify it, but the
direction of the modiﬁcation of the group’s behaviour generally
goes in the sense which the group perceives as being favoured by
the external agent, regardless of whether his intervention is
appropriate or not. This phenomenon, by which “people react
positively to the fact that they are being taken care of in order to
improve their situation, particularly when they are in a position of
weakness” (Bernoux, 1990) is called the “Hawthorne effect”, in
reference to workshops of the Western Electric Company
(Chicago, USA). During the 1920s and 1930s, a series of
experiments on work productivity were performed under the
supervision of Elton Mayo, professor at the Harvard Business
School. Those experiments showed that the productivity of the
workers increased as soon as they were aware of participating in
a pilot experiment, regardless of whether their work conditions
improved or deteriorated. The results of the experiments were
therefore not due to experimental factors, but to the fact that
workers were conscious of participating in an experiment. This
is why, according to Bernoux, “so many initiatives of
reorganization have brilliantly started only to quickly lose their
initial momentum”.
Although this effect was initially reported in an industrial context,
it can be presumed to accurately describe the behaviour of a
human group (village, ﬁshermen or farmers association, etc.) in
which an external agent momentarily intervenes with the
objective of inducing a change towards a more sustainable
environmental management. Whatever the pertinence of the
intervention of the external agent and regardless of the support it
receives from the group, there is a high probability that the group
will temporarily adopt “good practices”, at least in appearance, in
4 BILLÉ | P4
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“innovation enclaves”, around which the management systems
remain essentially unaltered. The existence of such enclaves is
accepted by the majority of stakeholders as long as they are not
destined to become spearheads of change. 
The Kerouallon experiment is an archetype for all three of those
factors (Hawthorne effect, exceptional conditions, decreasing
resources). “An elected representative of the urban community of
Brest met them [the involved farmers] individually in order to
explain to them the objectives of the study and sign the
cooperation convention” (Turpin et al., 1999). One easily imagines
– and this was the intent – how this could favour the rest of the
project, since each farmer felt acknowledged or even favoured.
The project leaders moreover add that “the teams in the ﬁeld
pledged to employ only permanent agents in order to avoid having
the farmers repeatedly give the same information to several
persons”. This appears to be another factor likely to favourably
inﬂuence the course of the project. One could even suppose that
due to regular contact, farmers and project agents will begin to
develop a relationship, which would further beneﬁt the quality of
information exchanges, the mutual trust and the motivation of the
farmers. The question is to what extent favourable conditions for
the implementation of a pilot experiment can be created without
invalidating its reproducibility? What value as an example can an
experiment in intensive agriculture have, that presents all the
conditions of trust, dialogue, information and implication of
farmers, which to say the least, is not the typical situation?
4.5 AN EVALUATION CHALLENGE
We already mentioned the seduction power of pilot experiments
as modes or organisation of action. This often leads to pilot
experiments being accompanied by an exaggerated sense of
optimism or even euphoria on the part of the stakeholders. Many
of them, and in particular the operators of public action, derive
great satisfaction from focusing the discussion on successful
local operations, or even better, on promising ﬂedgling
operations. As we have already pointed out, they absorb all
energies and convey the unveriﬁable impression that “one is
going in the right direction”, to the point of inducing a global
optimism far beyond the actual scope of the experiment. The
Hawthorne effect and the distortions related to the observation
that “every experiment begins by succeeding” (Conseil
Scientiﬁque de l'Evaluation, 1996) are generally ignored.
Furthermore, the mere fact of participating in an experiment
conveys to the stakeholders the exhilarating, but often mistaken
feeling of innovating, even where the same recipes have been
used time and again without any real success for decades (see for
example Lecomte, 1986, on the successive versions of
community-based management).
Pilot experiments also have a tendency to invalidate evaluation
processes, for two sets of reasons. First, the stated objective is
often to mobilise and create a new dynamic more than to directly
change the performance of an environmental management
system. The problem is that the emergence of a mobilization or
action dynamics is difﬁcult to measure in abstracto: it is only in
the light of the future behaviour of the concerned human groups
that it is possible to know whether a durable dynamic has been
created. In addition, there is the problem of scale. It is difﬁcult to
evaluate micro-experiences with regard to their impact on the
way in which the environment is managed. Moreover, pilot
experiments are often associated with the concept of adaptive
management, itself akin to the method of learning by doing. Even
though the usefulness of those concepts for the general case is in
no doubt and they are often justiﬁed in practice, they can through
gradual drifting lead to an understanding of action, in which
mistakes and failures become an integral part of the process. In
such a context, an evaluation is fundamentally invalidated,
including cases in which those errors equate to severe and largely
predictable failures. 
Finally, we saw before that pilot projects, and in a larger sense
pilot experiments, contribute to a fragmentation of public action.
This phenomenon leads to an “illegibility” (fr. “illisibilisation”,
Mermet, 2005) of environmental management systems, which
makes it extremely difﬁcult to discern the web of responsibilities,
to assign effects to practices or to identify trends.
Exaggerated optimism, invalidation of evaluation and illegibility 
of environmental management systems all seriously hinder
efforts to evaluate pilot experiments, and thereby to capitalize on
them, despite this being an essential condition for any kind of
collective learning.
5. CONCLUSION: A STRATEGY FOR CHANGE
WITH SEVERE LIMITATIONS
Heavy assumptions on collective action, the Hawthorne effect,
favourable conditions, exceptional resources, weak resistance
and difﬁculties in evaluating: all these do not automatically
deprive pilot experiments of any interest. However, those factors
are inevitably detrimental to the reproducibility of the
experiments and make the ﬁndings and lessons learnt from
them, either by the project bearers or by outside groups supposed
to adopt those changes, debatable. The underlying theory of
change is thus particularly weak. 
While there are no grounds to claim that the “pilot strategy” can
never work, it is evident that typically, a pilot experiment will not
“naturally” evolve towards generalisation. If a “ripple effect” is
really desired, it has to be precisely and strategically devised, as
much, and probably even more, than the experiment at the
“source” of the change. If the aim is to reach certain
environmental objectives at a given scale, an experiment at a
smaller scale, paired with a vague promise of generalization in
case of success, cannot be considered sufﬁcient. There are many
theoretical arguments warning that this change in scale is not
easy to accomplish, supported by many empirical examples of
failure in that respect. Considering this, the burden of proof should
in a way be inverted. The implicit hypothesis should be that a pilot
experiment may be valid for itself, and for its bearer (who may for
5BILLÉ | P5
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example want to test a new instrument or a new practice), but
rarely for other cases; unless a precise justiﬁcation can be put
forward, clearly stating the resources – including legislative –
required to generalize the experiment. Otherwise, the ﬁeld of
sustainable development will continue, like other ﬁelds, to be a
playground for an “inﬁnite multiplication of exceptions rather than
the transformation of the rule” (Behar, 1997).
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